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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As its economic weight grows, China is seeking a bigger role in global 
economic governance. While the country’s uncertain growth prospects 
means that China is unlikely to be the world’s sole economic leader, the 
United States will have to share global economic leadership with China, 
even if unequally. So far, however, the United States is not adapting to 
this eventuality very well. 
Washington’s mishandling of its response to the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, Congress’ failure to ratify IMF reform, and the decision 
to exclude China from the Trans-Pacific Partnership suggest that the 
United States is struggling to accommodate China’s desire to have a 
greater say in the way that the global economy is run. As shown by the 
issue of climate change, if Washington and Beijing can work together, it 
has the potential to lead to positive outcomes for the global economy. 
But if the United States does not work with China, it may well undermine 
its own leadership position over time.  
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The Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was 
officially launched on 30 June 2015. The institution has drawn support 
from 50 countries, despite Washington’s opposition to key aspects of the 
proposal and active US attempts to prevent countries from joining. 
These developments have led to widespread debate over the respective 
economic leadership roles of the world’s largest and second largest 
economies. Harvard University’s Larry Summers has suggested that the 
creation of the AIIB was the symbolic moment when the United States 
“lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system,”1 while 
Australian defence commentator Hugh White has asserted that the 
consensus within the United States on how to respond to China’s 
challenge to US primacy in Asia is unravelling.2  
These observations imply that US economic leadership is somehow 
diminishing. This is true to a certain extent, but claims that the end of US 
global economic leadership is imminent are premature. The United 
States remains the established economic power and the key financial 
centre for the world. The enduring size and resilience of the US 
economy continues to underpin its centrality in global economic and 
financial affairs.  
China’s growth miracle means that it now occupies a major place in the 
global economy. Yet China continues to face a complex set of 
macroeconomic challenges that make it highly unlikely that China will 
wrest global economic leadership from the United States. Much more 
likely is a situation in which China and the United States will share a role 
— and not necessarily an equal one — in shaping the future rules of the 
global economic game and responding to international economic 
challenges.  
The United States is, however, clearly struggling to adapt to a world in 
which it will have to share economic leadership with China. Its instinctive 
reaction against the AIIB coincided with its push for mega-regional trade 
agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the 
membership of which excludes China. While the ongoing failure of the 
US Congress to pass even modest reforms that would grant emerging 
markets a greater say in the governance of the IMF reflects more 
complex causes, it too suggests that Washington is looking uneasily 
over its shoulder at China’s advance. Indeed, many of these positions 
are undermining the global leadership the United States is keen to 
protect.  
A coherent world economic structure needs the United States and China 
to cooperate in shaping the rules and responding to challenges. As 
former World Bank President Robert Zoellick recently highlighted, the 
United States should be taking the initiative in adapting to the 
A coherent world 
economic structure 
needs the United States 
and China to cooperate 
in shaping the rules  
and responding to 
challenges. 
 US GLOBAL ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP: RESPONDING TO A RISING CHINA 
 
3
 
international economy and supporting China’s economic reformers, 
instead of resisting change.3 This will be particularly important heading 
into the Chinese Presidency of the Group of Twenty (G20) in 2016. 
Cooperation between the United States and China could spur on 
multilateralism, helping to provide global public goods for the world’s 
benefit.  
This Analysis explores the implications of the China–US relationship for 
some of the key economic issues requiring multilateral solutions: the 
international financial architecture, trade, investment, and climate 
change. 
A WORLD OF SOLE CHINESE ECONOMIC 
LEADERSHIP IS NOT IN PROSPECT  
The spectacular rise of China’s economy over the past four decades has 
coincided with its gradual embrace of the global institutions and norms 
established by the United States and its partners over the past 70 years. 
The numbers are staggering: the Chinese ‘growth miracle’ has seen a 
9.8 per cent average growth rate sustained between 1978 and 2010 and 
has brought more than 600 million people out of poverty.4 In late 2014, 
the IMF calculated that China is the largest economy in purchasing 
power parity terms.  
However, the macroeconomic challenges that China still faces suggest 
that sole Chinese economic leadership remains unlikely. Projecting a 
country’s growth prospects is generally a fraught exercise, but a few 
factors seem salient. First, Chinese domestic growth is slowing, and it is 
not clear where these levels will ‘bottom out’ or what a sustainable long-
term growth rate will be. Second, Chinese growth is dependent on its 
economy’s ability to readjust and evolve. China has done this 
consistently since 1976; for example, it was able to correct its current 
account surplus from 10 per cent of GDP in 2008 to around 2 per cent in 
2012 and reduce reliance on exports for growth.5 But China now faces 
challenges in ‘rebalancing’ its economy from high levels of investment 
(currently half of GDP) to a more sustainable consumption-driven model, 
managing demographic trends, and improving productivity levels. Third, 
China is at risk of falling into a middle income trap in which wage growth 
makes it uncompetitive in the export of manufactured goods, but where it 
cannot match advanced economies in the high value-added market. 
Fourth, continued development of the Chinese economy necessitates 
steps to open the Chinese capital account. Financial liberalisation is an 
important dimension of the transition to a more balanced and robust 
economy, and offers the potential for Chinese investors to seek higher 
returns on their savings and bring Chinese business and investment to 
the world, but it is a risky process and creates the potential for China to 
import financial shocks from abroad.  
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However, none of this changes the fact that China’s current economic 
weight makes it an important player in the global economy and a central 
player in policy discussions on evolving economic issues. Indeed, China 
is seeking a greater role in global economic governance for a number of 
reasons. Increased representation for China can be seen as an end in 
itself. More influence also means a greater ability to respond to emerging 
economic and governance developments that could undermine Chinese 
interests. Greater representation also allows China to ‘learn by doing’ 
and improve its domestic capacities in economic diplomacy and 
governance.6  
DOES NOT ALWAYS PLAY WELL WITH OTHERS 
Despite recognising the size and importance of the Chinese economy, 
the United States is struggling to accommodate China’s desire to play a 
greater role in global economic affairs. There appear to be a range of 
reasons for this, and not all of them seem to reflect a coherent, high-level 
policy decision to exclude China from global economic governance. In 
the case of the AIIB, for example, poor bureaucratic decision-making 
and coordination seemed to play a significant role. In other cases, 
notably the Congressional deadlock on IMF reform, US domestic politics 
seems to be the culprit. In trade, however, a stronger case can be made 
that the United States is in fact actively seeking to exclude China. 
INVESTMENT: THE AIIB 
The $US100 billion AIIB is modern China’s most ambitious foray into 
global economic governance. The AIIB has two stated goals: to 
contribute to global efforts to plug Asia’s large infrastructure funding gap; 
and to deepen regional cooperation.7 The economic imperative behind 
this decision is clear. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has 
estimated Asian funding needs between 2010 and 2020 at 
$US747 billion per year in national infrastructure and $US29 billion per 
year in regional infrastructure.8 The infrastructure demand is far greater 
than the ability of existing multilateral development banks to meet it. The 
ADB has a capital base of $US165 billion, and the World Bank has 
$US223 billion.9  
Despite this rationale, the geopolitics around the bank has been 
contentious. Lou Jiwei, the Chinese Finance Minister, stated at the 
official launch of the AIIB that the bank represented “China assuming 
more international responsibility for the development of the Asian and 
global economies.” Although China argues that the AIIB will create 
‘win-win’ solutions to infrastructure challenges, there is no doubt that it 
will enhance China’s direct influence over the scope and type of future 
public infrastructure projects in Asia. The AIIB, like the raft of investment 
initiatives that are part of the ‘belt and road’ development initiative, helps 
to consolidate China’s position as Asia’s economic hub and establish its 
credentials as a regional political leader.10 
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Fears that the AIIB will expand China’s presence and influence at the 
expense of the United States and Japan have seen both nations decline 
invitations to be founding members of the bank. US officials also tried to 
actively dissuade other countries from joining the AIIB. They publicly 
questioned the governance arrangements, pressured Australia and 
South Korea to decline invitations in October 2014, and pointedly 
rebuked the United Kingdom when it chose to join in March 2015.11  
While governance concerns associated with the level of influence China 
would wield within the bank had some credence, particularly in the early 
stages of negotiations, China has demonstrated a willingness to 
negotiate and adapt. China has embarked on a significant ‘charm 
offensive’ in its approach to soliciting membership. As part of this effort it 
has sought to portray the AIIB as a multilateral institution and opened 
membership to a wide range of countries. China has been willing to 
make accommodations on key terms of the articles of association and 
has given up a veto over routine institutional decisions. China has also 
continued to emphasise the economic and commercial potential of the 
arrangement, which has increased as the bank’s starting capital has 
doubled from an initial goal of $US50 billion to $US100 billion. It is clear 
that China sees the AIIB as a means of improving its international 
diplomacy and developing technical expertise. 
The US’s initial resistance to the bank won it few friends and stoked 
perceptions that it was simply opposed to a new Chinese-led institution. 
Washington’s approach has been criticised heavily for overlooking the 
daunting series of challenges facing the international financial system, 
and for being inconsistent with its own call for Beijing to be a more 
responsible stakeholder in global affairs.  
The failure of Washington’s approach to the AIIB reflects two tactical 
errors: underestimating the nature of the AIIB as ‘just another Chinese 
investment initiative’; and misreading the appeal of the new 
arrangements to the international community. In both cases the 
mishandling of the AIIB issue seems to have stemmed from bureaucratic 
mistakes rather than any well-considered decision to oppose the bank. 
In particular, as one US official remarked, there was insufficient ‘adult 
supervision’ at the US Treasury, and Asian foreign affairs experts were 
not appropriately consulted in the course of negotiations.12 This led to a 
contradiction between behind-the-scenes bureaucratic opposition to the 
bank and the official US line, which has continually welcomed the idea of 
an infrastructure bank for Asia while insisting that it meet international 
standards of governance and transparency.13 
Many in the United States now recognise that the government handled 
the AIIB poorly.14 As former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
argued: “The bottom line, I think, is that we screwed up. We should not 
have done it this way.”15 In the words of one former multilateral 
development bank official:  
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“US government officials could have just asked the question, 
‘What is China’s vision for the new bank and how would it be 
different from the ADB and World Bank?’ and then sat back and 
seen how things developed. But they attacked it instead, lobbied 
others not to join and, having failed to stop the Brits from joining, 
committed the original sin of whining to the world about their 
failure.”16  
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: THE IMF AND RENMINBI 
A second example of the United States’ failure to accommodate China in 
global economic governance concerns the IMF. The 2010 reforms to 
IMF quota and governance arrangements aim to increase the voice and 
representation of fast-growing emerging markets in decision-making, 
and reduce the overrepresentation of European countries on the IMF 
Executive Board. When implemented, the reforms are expected to result 
in a larger shift in quota shares to China and other emerging market 
economies, and will also help to secure a larger permanent resource 
base for the fund. Although modest in nature, the governance reforms 
would make China the third-largest member of the IMF. In addition, the 
governance reforms were intended to set in motion other governance 
changes, including a review of the formula for determining quota 
allocations in December 2015, that would lead to bigger shifts in quota 
shares to China and other emerging market economies.  
The original date for implementation of the reforms by all countries was 
the end of 2012, but the US Congress has blocked the reforms.17 IMF 
reform cannot proceed without the US vote, as it has a veto share of 
16.75 per cent of IMF votes and the required majority threshold for the 
decision is 85 per cent.18  
The IMF has long been a controversial institution in the United States, 
and US congressional challenges to IMF reform are not new.19 The 
successful advancements in the IMF agenda following the global 
financial crisis probably stemmed from an exceptional set of 
circumstances. Strengthening the IMF was identified as a necessary part 
of the global policy response to the crisis, and it helped that the 
Democrats controlled the White House as well as both houses of the US 
Congress. Times have now changed, however. The Republicans who 
now control Congress are sceptical of the IMF. The chances of IMF 
reform in the short term are therefore limited at best.  
At stake, however, is not just a failure to recognise the stake of China 
and other emerging markets in global governance. The IMF needs China 
and other emerging markets to help it deal with some of its key 
challenges. But unless China is given a greater say in how the 
organisation is run, it may not help. The most pressing issue is what will 
happen to $US369 billion in bilateral loans between the IMF and 
member countries that were agreed to in 2012 and that will largely expire 
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in late 2016 and 2017.20 Although these loans have not yet been called 
upon, they provide an important reassurance to financial markets that 
the IMF has the necessary discretion to make important decisions. An 
additional $US500 billion of IMF resourcing comes from ‘New 
Arrangements to Borrow’ — borrowed funds that need to be renewed 
every six months. With a bigger stake in the IMF’s future, for example, 
China might use its term as G20 President in 2016 to lead negotiations 
around a deal on IMF resourcing.  
Delays in IMF reform have sparked discussion about what can be done 
to give effect to the reforms in the absence of US ratification. In 
particular, a set of creative but highly technical ‘Plan B’ alternatives have 
been canvassed within the IMF, but such proposals are modest in nature 
and these discussions have not been able to produce substantive 
outcomes. There have also been calls to explore options outside the 
IMF, such as enhancing regional alternatives to the IMF, including the 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation and the BRICS Contingent 
Reserve Arrangement; China is a part of both initiatives. However, these 
regional options are more symbolic than substantive and contribute little 
to the existing rules-based order.21  
While China has found obstacles at the IMF, it has been able to expand 
its bilateral links within the international monetary system. The People’s 
Bank of China has extended bilateral swap lines to approximately 
30 central banks worldwide since 2008.22 More controversially, China 
has also provided bilateral assistance to Argentina, Russia, and 
Venezuela in recent times.23  
Washington’s poorly handled response to the AIIB and the failure of US 
Congress to ratify IMF reform places additional pressure on the looming 
decision on Special Drawing Rights (SDR). The SDR review at the end 
of 2015 will consider whether to add the renminbi to the basket of 
currencies that form the IMF’s de facto reserve currency, currently made 
up of the US Dollar, Yen, Euro, and Pound Sterling. The United States 
could veto the decision, as the inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR 
basket potentially requires an 85 per cent supermajority of voting shares 
on the IMF’s Executive Board.24 China has been actively campaigning to 
promote its currency in regional trade and reduce dependence on the 
US Dollar. There has been a growing internationalisation of the Yuan, 
although the US Dollar is still used to settle the vast majority of 
international trade and investment transactions.25  
The pace of advancement in reforming yuan convertibility has led IMF 
Managing Director Christine Lagarde to state that China’s accession to 
the SDR basket is not a question of if, but when.26 However, 2015 may 
still be too soon. As Chinese IMF Deputy Managing Director Zhu Min 
noted, “there are still some obstructions” to a freely usable renminbi.27 
Nonetheless, if the United States exercises its veto to block the SDR 
basket addition, this could be interpreted as further evidence of 
China has been actively 
campaigning to promote 
its currency in regional 
trade and reduce 
dependence on the US 
Dollar. 
 US GLOBAL ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP: RESPONDING TO A RISING CHINA 
 
8  
 
Washington standing in the way of China assuming a bigger role in the 
international monetary system.  
TRADE 
Trade is the main area where US policy seems most explicitly aimed at 
containing China’s role in the global economy. Since 1948, the global 
economy has prospered through a rules-based global trading system 
administered by the third pillar of the Bretton Woods’ system, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO has helped to ensure that the 
world is not plagued by protectionism and retaliatory trade wars between 
countries. China itself has benefited from the system. Its accession to 
the WTO in 2001 coincided with its remarkable economic and trade 
growth. 
However, in the last 20 years, multilateral efforts in the WTO have 
yielded few results. Many countries have turned to bilateral and regional 
trade agreements as well as mega-regional trade negotiations such as 
the TPP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
and Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). These agreements are shifting 
international trade rules.  
These mega-regional trade negotiations are ambitious in scope. The 
TPP is being negotiated across 12 countries with a combined GDP of 
$US28 trillion and a total population of 800 million.28 The negotiations 
extend beyond traditional trade considerations to ‘behind the borders’ 
issues such as intellectual property, legal and institutional issues, and 
environmental issues. However, it is difficult to know what specific issues 
will be agreed because the negotiations have been conducted in secret. 
Importantly, these major rules-setting agreements exclude most 
emerging market and developing countries, notably Brazil, India, and 
China. Although details remain unclear, there are reasons to suspect 
that the economic benefits will be small in magnitude, and as with any 
regional (or bilateral) arrangement, they carry a strong risk of leading to 
trade diversion rather than trade creation.  
It is also clear that the TPP has purposes beyond just trade. US Defense 
Secretary Ashton Carter has argued that the TPP will deepen US 
alliances and partnerships abroad, underscore a lasting commitment to 
the Asia-Pacific, and help promote a global order that reflects both US 
interests and values. Amid a divisive domestic political debate around 
the topic, US President Obama has stated that “if we do not help to 
shape the rules so that our businesses and our workers can compete in 
those markets, then China will set up rules that advantage Chinese 
workers and Chinese businesses.” More bluntly still he said, “we have to 
rewrite the rules for the global economy before countries like 
China do.”29  
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The idea that the United States must write the rules while it has the 
chance reinforces the perception in Beijing that Washington is seeking to 
exclude it from the process of setting new regional trade rules. This 
rhetoric has helped to shift Chinese domestic opinion against the TPP, 
despite the fact that the TPP’s focus on high standards for state-owned 
enterprises, labour, and the environment are generally supported by 
advocates for economic reform within China.30 Against this background 
it is not surprising that China is pushing the negotiation of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an alternative mega-
regional trade arrangement, on a broad range of issues including trade, 
services, intellectual property, competition, and investment. 
THE ADVANTAGES OF WORKING TOGETHER 
The inability of the United States to fully accommodate China’s desire for 
a greater say in the way the global economy is run does not just have 
negative consequences for the global economy or indeed for the 
leadership position that the United States is trying to protect. There are a 
range of positive outcomes that could result from Washington being 
more accommodating of China’s wishes, without completely capitulating 
to them.  
INVESTMENT 
Even the AIIB with its $US100 billion capital base will contribute only a 
fraction of the funds needed to plug the investment gaps in Asia. 
Moreover, the AIIB still has a long way to go before it will be in a position 
to lend responsibly. Lowy Institute Nonresident Fellow Mike Callaghan 
emphasises that the bank needs a business plan with proper processes 
and procedures relating to financing, procurement, safeguards, and 
recruitment. The bank will also need to establish the roles, 
responsibilities, and expectations of its board, management, and staff.31  
By providing technical advice and expertise the United States could help 
ensure that AIIB delivers the best infrastructure projects possible. Once 
the AIIB is functioning, it will also need to complement the World Bank, 
the ADB, and other development banks if the multilateral development 
banking system is collectively to deliver the best infrastructure projects 
for the Asian region. As the biggest stakeholders in these institutions, 
cooperation between the United States and China (and other regional 
powers like Japan) will determine how these banks interact and, 
ultimately, how much they achieve in addressing the investment 
challenge and contributing towards global growth.  
TRADE  
Despite the current exclusion of China, the United States may eventually 
find its commercial interests are better served by opening access to the 
TPP (and TTIP and TiSA) on equal terms to China and other key 
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emerging markets. Increasing the scope of mega-regional arrangements 
to additional countries ensures that US-driven rules and norms are 
adopted by a broader representation of the global community. A 
comprehensive agreement that more closely resembles a multilateral 
trade agreement carries more economic benefits as it lessens the risk of 
trade diversion.  
The United States has itself foreshadowed that China may one day be 
invited to join the TPP.32 However, as already noted, the way that the 
United States has approached and talked about the TPP has made such 
a prospect less appealing in China domestically. A possible compromise 
might be a combination of the TPP and RCEP (once both are finalised), 
or at least complementary dimensions of the two agreements, into a 
‘super-mega-regional arrangement’. This could be a way for the United 
States and China to forge a consensus in areas of mutual interest and 
collectively contribute to the setting of international trading rules.  
From a global trade perspective, even this would be far from ideal. 
These deals are not really compatible with a trading system dominated 
by global value chains and goods that are ‘made in the world’. A regional 
focus also ignores the many large trade issues that are best tackled in 
genuinely multilateral forums, such as trade facilitation, financial 
liberalisation, telecommunications liberalisation, and the reduction or 
removal of farming subsidies. The United States and China would better 
serve the interests of the global economy by spearheading efforts to fix 
the WTO. This could start with its negotiating structure, so that the 
institution is able to successfully oversee common global standards in 
light of the proliferating mega-regional trade arrangements. 
IMF REFORM 
It is likely that China will continue to be frustrated by the lack of progress 
on IMF reform in the short term. This will be exacerbated by the lack of 
pragmatic and substantive alternatives available in the monetary system. 
If the renminbi joins the SDR basket in 2015, this will provide a symbolic 
boost to China. However, this is not guaranteed because there are 
technical criteria that need to be met and important work is still needed 
to ensure that market forces determine the price of the yuan. If 2015 is 
too soon, the next SDR review in 2020 is too far away. A reasonable 
compromise could be to bring forward the next review to 2016 or 2017. It 
will require a delicate balancing act to support China while maintaining 
the independence of IMF processes.  
This is one realm in which the benefits of US–China cooperation would 
lead to outcomes that disproportionately benefit China. By being 
steadfast and patient, both in terms of timeframes for the inclusion of the 
renminbi in the SDR basket and in discussions on IMF resourcing and 
the renewal of bilateral loans, China will go a long way towards 
reassuring the international community that it is intent on becoming a 
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responsible global stakeholder. If China were to champion efforts to 
secure the IMF’s resourcing as part of its G20 Presidency in 2016, it 
would demonstrate a commitment to delivering outcomes that are in the 
global public good. It may also facilitate compromise on China’s priorities 
in other areas of the G20 agenda. 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
A clear example of what can be achieved if the United States and China 
work together is in the setting of carbon emissions targets. At the 2014 
APEC Summit, President Obama and President Xi jointly pledged to 
reduce carbon emissions. The United States aims to reduce its 
emissions by 26 to 28 per cent below 2005 levels by 2025, while China 
aims to reach ‘peak emissions’ around 2030 and increase the share of 
non-fossil fuels to 20 per cent of total energy use.33 President Obama’s 
new ‘Clean Power Plan’ could contribute up to a quarter of the 
reductions needed for the United States to meet its national emissions 
target.34 The United States has also been integral to the June 2015 G7 
commitment to ‘decarbonise’ the global economy by 2100.35 China in 
turn announced a hard target for emissions in which it pledged to reduce 
the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to its GDP by 60 to 65 per cent 
below 2005 levels by 2030.36  
It remains to be seen whether the US–China agreement will be a 
catalyst for climate change action. Ongoing leadership from both powers 
is needed in brokering a technical agreement on emissions. Two key 
events will be crucial in effecting a global agreement: the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of 
the Parties negotiations in Paris in December 2015 (COP21) to broker a 
technical agreement on emissions; and the G20 Leaders’ Summit a few 
weeks beforehand, when leaders from the world’s largest carbon-
emitting countries will have an opportunity to make their intentions 
known. Climate change was controversial at the November 2014 
Brisbane G20 Leaders’ Summit, with the G20 unable to reach 
consensus even on the timeframe for reporting country commitments. 
Despite the US–China agreement, the G20’s indecision robbed climate 
discussions of much-needed momentum. This was further eroded during 
the painstaking negotiations on technical issues at the UNFCCC COP20 
in Lima in December 2014.  
The chequered history of global climate change negotiations shows that 
reaching an international agreement on reducing emissions will be very 
difficult. But with the United States pushing the G7 to commit, and 
China’s potential to be an influential voice for major emerging market 
economies, there are signs that the two countries may just be able to 
provide the joint global leadership that is required.  
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WHAT DOES THE TEMPESTUOUS US–CHINA 
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP MEAN FOR AUSTRALIA?  
Australia has important bilateral relationships with both the United States 
and China. The United States has long been a strategic ally and an 
important economic and trading partner, while China is now Australia’s 
largest trading partner and a major source of demand for key Australian 
sectors. It is in Australia’s interests to promote US–China economic 
cooperation through regional and multilateral architecture. Australia also 
benefits greatly from international economic rules.37 
Australia should encourage the United States to accommodate China’s 
desire to play a greater role in global economic governance where 
possible and practicable, while protecting the interests of smaller Asian 
players. But Australia will also need to be wary of Chinese efforts. 
Australian officials will need to engage allies and strategic partners in 
efforts to draw China into playing a global leadership role within the 
rules-based system. Australia should also encourage decision-making 
through multilateral forums that bring together the world’s major 
advanced and emerging economies, for example the G20, and maintain 
a constructive approach towards such forums. This approach also 
means supporting China’s constructive additions to the global 
institutional regime, such as the AIIB, and engaging actively in efforts to 
contribute to a better Chinese understanding of multilateralism.  
CONCLUSION 
Through the establishment of the AIIB, China has signalled that it is 
willing to play a more prominent leadership role in the global economy. 
China’s ongoing economic challenges means that Beijing is not about to 
supplant Washington’s leadership in global economic governance. 
Nevertheless, the size and importance of the Chinese economy 
underlines that Beijing will want a bigger say in defining global economic 
rules.  
The inability of the United States to accommodate China’s rise in global 
economic governance has negative consequences for both the health of 
the global economy and for the United States’ current leadership role. 
China is prepared to work around US resistance by cooperating with the 
broader international community, including US allies, which may 
ultimately undermine the very leadership position that Washington is 
trying to protect.  
A renewed effort is needed to ensure that China’s economic weight is 
brought into the existing rules-based international order. There are 
several practical steps to do this. The US Congress should pass IMF 
quota and governance reforms, as the world needs an effective 
cornerstone institution for the international monetary system. Meanwhile, 
the international community should forge ahead with a deal on the 
Australian officials will 
need to engage allies 
and strategic partners in 
efforts to draw China into 
playing a global 
leadership role within the 
rules-based system. 
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renewal of IMF bilateral loans, and China should use its 2016 
G20 Presidency to demonstrate a pragmatic commitment to the rules-
based order by making this an international priority. A better functioning 
international trading system is crucial for boosting global growth. Any 
efforts to reinvigorate the multilateral trade agenda by addressing the 
way that international trade deals are made will depend on US–China 
cooperation. As the issue of climate change demonstrates, cooperation 
between the United States and China carries the promise of economic 
solutions that deliver global benefits.  
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